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SUMMARY
Tax rate changes are some of the most significant and far-reaching decisions a government can take.
A good understanding of the odds of any such changes is essential for any business debating the
timing and location of investments. This paper investigates the factors that affect the timing of
statutory tax rate changes by Canadian provincial governments. The authors develop a simple
theoretical model to explain the “stickiness” of tax rates — the factors that lead a province to decide
against tinkering with the tax system — based on the presence of fixed costs of adjusting tax rates.
The results indicate that if the current rate falls within a range of tax rates bracketing the optimal rate,
then the government will not adjust its tax rate because the cost of the reform outweighs the potential
benefits. To build up a body of evidence, this paper employs a multinomial logit model to examine the
likelihood of changes to personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), and provincial sales
tax (PST) rates by provincial governments over the period 1973-2010. Regression results indicate
that provincial governments that start with higher tax rates are more likely to cut, and less likely to
raise, their tax rates. A higher provincial budget deficit reduces the probability of a CIT rate cut and
raises the probability of a PST rate increase. Party ideology seems to matter. Provinces with left-
leaning governments are less likely to cut PIT and PST rates, and more likely to raise PIT rates
compared to non-left-leaning governments. The authors also find that a federal PIT rate cut raises the
probability of a provincial PIT rate increase, whereas a federal CIT rate cut raises the probability of a
provincial CIT rate reduction.
† We would like to thank Kenneth McKenzie, Anindya Sen, and participants at the 47th Canadian Economics
Association meeting in Montreal and Deloitte Tax Policy Research Symposium in Toronto. All remaining errors
are our own.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Taxes affect labour supply, saving, investment and a wide range of other private sector
economic decisions. The changes in the allocation of resources induced by the tax system can
result in large efficiency losses for the economy. Tax-funded public services and infrastructure
benefit society when tax revenue is obtained from sources that impose the minimum possible
efficiency costs on the private sector. The literature on optimal taxation indicates that this can be
achieved — if tax rates are set so that the marginal cost of public funds is equalized across tax
bases and are equal to the marginal benefit of government spending financed by the tax revenue. 
The implication of this is that governments should adjust tax rates in response to changing
economic and fiscal conditions, in order to attain the optimal level and pattern of tax rates.
However, frequent tax rate changes are not common in practice. For example, between 1973 and
2010, Canadian provincial governments only changed their personal income tax rates 137 times
out of a possible 380 province-year episodes. In other words, 65 per cent of the time, the
provinces did not change their personal income tax rates. Corporate income tax rate changes
were even less frequent, with only 83 corporate income tax rate changes, and only 52 sales tax
rate changes by the provincial governments. Thus, 78 per cent of the time there were no
provincial corporate income tax rate changes and 86 per cent of the time there were no sales tax
rate changes. Clearly, tax rates are “sticky,” a characteristic that does not seem to be consistent
with the normative theory of optimal taxation, or with conventional models of tax competition
by subnational governments.
Obviously the decision to change tax rates involves a comparison of the gains from adjusting the
tax rate with the cost of adjusting the tax rate, including political costs.1 Governments are less likely
to embark on tax reform when the costs of tax rate changes outweigh the potential gains. What
factors tip the balance and make tax rate changes more likely? Is it possible to predict the timing
and direction of tax rate changes? We explore these and related important issues in this paper.
There is a paucity of empirical studies that examine the factors that influence the likelihood of
tax rate changes in a discrete choice-decision setting. Some of the related studies include
Devereux et al for cigarette taxes,2 Heinemann et al3 and Hassett and Mathur4 for corporate
income tax, Foremny and Riedel5 for business taxes and Adjei6 for personal income tax.7 Hassett
and Mathur8 employ a probit model to analyze the factors that motivate governments to embark
on corporate income tax rate cut reforms. Their results suggest that countries that cut the 
1 See for example Hettich, W. and S. Winer. 1988. “Economic and political foundations of tax structure,” American
Economic Review 9:701-712.
2 Devereux, M., B. Lockwood, and M. Redoano. 2007. “Horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition: theory and
some evidence from the USA,” Journal of Public Economics 91: 451–79. 
3 Heinemann, F., M. Overesch, and J. Rincke. 2010. “Rate cutting tax reforms and corporate tax competition in Europe,”
Economics and Politics 22: 498-518.
4 Hassett, K. and A. Mathur. 2007. “Predicting tax reform,” American Enterprise Institute. Institute for Public Policy
Research. Working Paper Number 138.
5 Foremny, D. and N. Riedel. 2012. “Business taxes and the electoral cycle,” CESifo Working paper number 3729.
6 Adjei, E. 2012. “Empirical analysis of tax competition among provincial governments in Canada,” MA. Thesis.
University of Alberta.
7 See Appendix 2 for a more detailed description of the data, statistical techniques and key results in previous studies.
The inclusions of federal tax rates of course imply that year-specific effects cannot be included in the model.
8 2007. Op. cit.
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corporate income tax rate in the past are more likely to cut the tax rate again. The study also
indicates that countries which have a higher corporate income tax rate than their neighbours are
more likely to lower their tax rates. In a binary response setting, Heinemann et al9 also
investigate the determinants of the likelihood of corporate income tax cuts for European
countries. They find that countries are more likely to cut their corporate income tax rates when
they have inherited a higher tax rate and neighbours’ tax rates are lower. Foremny and Riedel10
analyze how political cycles influence business tax rate choices using data from German
municipalities.  
Our study is most closely related to Adjei,11 which uses panel data from Canadian provinces to
examine the factors that influence the occurrence and magnitude of personal income tax rate
changes. His findings suggest that the occurrence of tax rate changes is affected by the federal
personal income tax rate, and that horizontal tax competition influences the magnitude of the
tax rate changes. As the focus of Adjei12 is simply on the likelihood of personal income tax rate
change, the study does not analyze the factors that affect the likelihood of personal income tax
rate cuts and increases separately. One would expect that provincial governments may have
asymmetric responses to changes in some of the factors that cause tax rate changes. That is,
changes in the fiscal environment can have different effects on the probabilities of tax rate cuts
or tax rate increases. Analyzing the likelihood of tax rate cuts and tax rate increases separately,
rather than tax rate changes, should provide better insights into governments’ fiscal responses. 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the factors that influence the likelihood of tax
rate cuts and tax rate increases for the personal income tax (PIT), the corporate income tax
(CIT), and the general sales tax (PST) imposed by Canadian provincial governments. This
study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, we present a simple theoretical
model to explain the “stickiness” of tax rates based on the presence of a fixed cost of adjusting
tax rates. In this model, the decision to adjust tax rates involves a comparison of the gains from
adjusting the tax rate to the optimal tax rate, with the administration and political costs
associated with the tax reform. If the government’s tax rate falls within a range of tax rates
bracketing the optimal tax rate, then the government will not adjust its tax rate, even if it is not
the optimal tax rate. The reason for this is that the cost of the tax reform outweighs the
potential benefit from the reform.
The second contribution of this paper is that we provide an empirical analysis of the factors
that influence governments’ tax rate change decisions in a multi-category discrete tax rate
choice setting. Previous empirical studies generally frame their analyses as governments
having only two choices and employing either logit or probit models. In reality, governments
face three distinctive choices about tax rate changes: to lower the tax rate, to raise the tax rate
or to keep the tax rate unchanged. Since governments face multiple choices, the appropriate
empirical approach needs to take this reality into account. Thus, to address this issue, we
employ the multinomial logit regression method in this paper. Using panel data from Canadian
provincial governments for the period 1973-2010, our analysis focuses on changes in statutory
9 2010. Op. cit.
10 2012. Op. cit. 
11 2012. Op. cit.
12 Ibid.
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3PIT, CIT, and PST rates. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to employ
multinomial logit models and frame tax rate reforms as multi-category choice decisions. While
the use of such an empirical approach is rare in empirical studies of tax rate changes, it is quite
commonly used in studies of occupational choices,13 locational choices14 and exchange rate
regime choices.15 Lunderborg and Skedinger16 also use such a method to analyze the effects of
capital taxation on household mobility. 
Our results indicate that a provincial government that starts with a higher tax rate is more
likely to cut, and less likely to raise, its tax rate. The empirical results show that a higher
provincial budget deficit-to-GDP ratio reduces the probability of a CIT rate cut and raises the
probability of a PST rate increase. We also find that provinces with left-leaning governments
are less likely to cut and more likely to raise personal income tax rates. They are also less
likely to cut the PST rate. Moreover, the results suggest that provincial governments are less
likely to raise sales taxes during an election year. Another important finding of our paper is that
provincial governments are more likely to cut their PIT and CIT rates when their neighbours
lower their rates. We also find that provinces are more likely to increase their PST rates when
their neighbours raise their rates. These results are broadly consistent with the horizontal tax
competition literature. We also find that a federal PIT rate cut raises the probability of a
provincial PIT rate increase, whereas a federal CIT rate cut raises the probability of a
provincial CIT rate reduction. A higher provincial PIT rate raises the probability of a provincial
CIT rate increase. Finally, an increase in a per-capita grant from the federal government raises
the probability of a CIT rate reduction.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a simple
theoretical framework to explain how governments adjust their tax rates. Section 3 discusses
the empirical methodology and data used in the study. The empirical results are presented and
discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes and highlights the policy implications of
the paper. 
13 See Schmidt, P. and R. Strauss. 1975. “The prediction of occupation using multiple logit models,” International
Economic Review 16: 471-486; and Harper, B. and M. Haq. 2001. “Ambition, discrimination, and occupational
attainment: a study of a British cohort,” Oxford Economic Papers 53: 695-720.
14 See Gabriel, S. and S. Rosenthal. 1989. “Household location and race: estimates of a multinomial logit model,”
Review of Economics and Statistics 71: 240-249; Green, D. 1999. “Immigrant occupational attainment: assimilation
and mobility over time,” Journal of Labour Economics 17: 49-79; and Abramitzky, R. 2009. “The effect of
redistribution on migration: evidence from Israeli Kibbutz,” Journal of Public Economics 93: 498-511.
15 Berdiev, A., Kim, Y., C.P. Chang. 2012. “The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and
developing countries,” European Journal of Political Economy 28: 38-53. 
16 Lunderborg, P. and P. Skedinger. 1998. “Capital gains taxation and residential mobility in Sweden,” Journal of
Public Economics 67: 399-419.
2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF TAX RATE ADJUSTMENT
Suppose a government imposes taxes on a commodity X where the representative consumer’s
utility function is:
U = αln (X) + (1–α) ln(Z) + bg (1)
where 0 < α < 1 is the share of the consumer’s income, M, that is spent on X. Z represents all
of the other untaxed private goods and g is a publicly provided good with a constant marginal
utility b > 0.  It is assumed that the producer prices of the three goods, X, Z, and g are constant
and equal to one. The consumer’s budget constraint is:
M = (1+τ)X +Z (2)
where τ is the tax rate imposed on consumption of X. The tax revenue collected by the
government is:
R = 1+τ αM (3)
All of the government’s revenues are spent on the public good g. The government’s marginal
cost of public funds, MCF, is equal to the following:
MCF =          =1+τ (4)
The marginal benefit from the public service is MB. Assuming that the cost of producing one
unit of the public service is one, the optimal tax expenditure policy would be to set the tax rate
such that MCF = MB or in other words to set the tax rate at τo = MB – 1.
Suppose that the government’s tax rate is currently set at τ ≠ τo. In the absence of adjustment
costs, the government’s optimal policy would be to immediately change the tax rate to τo.
However, suppose there is a fixed cost, A, to adjusting the tax rate. This fixed cost might
involve printing new tax forms. Perhaps more importantly, there may be a cost of reaching an
agreement in the cabinet and Legislature on the need for a tax rate change. The decision to
adjust the tax rate will then involve a comparison of the gains from adjusting the tax rate to the
optimal tax rate τo with the adjustment cost that will be incurred. Figure 1 illustrates the gain,











MCF = 1 +
MB
Tax Rate
The gain from a small reduction in the tax rate which reduces tax revenues by one dollar is
given by the gap between the current MCF and MB. As the tax rate is further reduced, the
MCF declines and the gain from further reductions in tax revenues and expenditure on g also
declines. The total gain from reducing the tax rate from τ to τo can be approximated as:
G = 0.5 (MB – MCF) ΔR            (5)
where ΔR is the change in tax revenue when the tax rate changes from τ to τo. Suppose that the
cost of this once-and-for-all tax rate change is A. The present value of the gain from the tax
rate change is G/r where r is the discount rate that the government uses to calculate the present
value of the gains from policy adjustments. The tax rate adjustment is worthwhile if rA < G;
otherwise the government should continue with its current tax/expenditure policy.
Since A is a fixed cost and the gain from a tax rate adjustment decreases as the (absolute value)
of the tax rate change diminishes, there is a range of tax rates, τl to τu, over which it is not
worthwhile to make the tax rate adjustment.  
Below we derive the upper and lower bounds for the tax rate departures from the optimal tax
rate τo. A tax rate adjustment does not yield a net gain if rA = G. Using the expressions for the
MCF and R in equations (3) and (4), this condition can be written as:
rA = 0.5 (1+τo – (1+τ)) [ 1+τo – 1+τ ] αM (6)
Let ρ = (rA)/(αM) be the ratio of the equivalent annual adjustment cost to the expenditure on
the taxed commodity. Solving (6) for τ, we obtain the following:
τu = τo +(ρ + √(1+ρ)2 – 1) (1 + τo) (7)
τl = τo +(ρ + √(1+ρ)2 – 1) (1 + τo) (8)
Therefore the government will reduce its tax rate if τ > τu and increase its tax rate if τ < τl.
If τl < τ < τu the government would not change its current tax/expenditure policy.
As is expected, τu is increasing in τo and ρ:
dτu = ρ + 1 –√(ρ + 1)2 – 1 > 0 (9a)
dτu = (1 + τo) [
ρ + 1 + 1 ] > 0 (9b)
and τl is increasing in τo and decreasing in ρ:
dτl = ρ + 1 √(ρ + 1)2 – 1 > 0 (10a)
dτl = (1 + τo) [1 –
ρ + 1
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In other words, a fiscal event that raises the optimal tax rate will reduce the likelihood of a tax
rate reduction and increase the likelihood of a tax rate increase. An increase in the cost of
making a tax rate change will increase the likelihood that no tax rate change takes place.
Note that dτu/dτo > dτl/dτo. This implies that the minimum observed tax rate reduction, τu - τo
will exceed the minimum observed tax rate increase, τo - τl. More generally, we expect
asymmetric responses to events that might trigger tax rate increases or decreases.
Figure 2 shows the τu and τl for τo = 0.25 when ρ varies from 0 to 0.01.
FIGURE 2
If the annual equivalent adjustment cost is one per cent of the expenditure on the taxed
commodity, then no tax change would be observed as long as the tax rate is between 0.085 and
0.44.
In conclusion, we have developed a simple model that explains the “stickiness” of tax rates
based on the presence of a fixed cost of adjusting tax rates. If the government’s tax rate falls
within a range of tax rates bracketing the optimal tax rate, then the government will not adjust
its tax rate, even if its current tax rate is not the optimal tax rate. In the next section, we use
this model as the basic framework for investigating tax rate changes by Canadian provincial
governments. More specifically, we explore the impacts of various factors that influence the
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3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
3.1. Empirical Methodology
We estimate a multinomial logit model of tax reform in which provincial governments choose
to lower, raise or leave tax rates unchanged. That is, in our analysis, the provincial government
faces three distinctive choices about tax rates: to lower the tax rate (category, j = 1), to keep the
tax rate unchanged (category, j = 2), or to raise the tax rate (category, j = 3). Since the
government faces multiple choices, the appropriate econometric method commonly used in the
literature is Multinomial Logistic Regression. Basically the method extends the commonly
used logit model to accommodate unordered multiple discrete outcomes.17 See Wooldridge
(2002). The use of such an econometric method is based on the simple model of tax adjustment
outlined in Section 2. 
Consider provincial government i which faces both the political costs and benefits associated
with tax reforms. Let Yi denote a random variable taking on category values J = 1, 2, 3, where
Y = 1 when Δτ < 0 and the government reduces its tax rate, Y = 2 when Δτ = 0 and it leaves its
tax rate unchanged, and Y = 3 when Δτ > 0 and it increases its tax rate. The probability (Pr) of
choosing category j is such that:
Pr (Yi = 1) = Pr (τ > τu) (11a)
Pr (Yi = 3) = Pr (τ < τl) (11b)
Pr (Yi = 2) = 1 – (Pr (Yi = 1) + Pr (Yi = 3)) (11c)
Eq. (11c) captures the probability that the government would not change its tax rate and
corresponds to the “sticky” tax rate region implied in the simple model.
We assume that the critical tax rates, τu and τl can be written as: 
τui = β11 x1i + β12 x2i + ⋯ + β1n xni + ε1i (12a)
τli = β31 x1i + β32 x2i + ⋯ + β3n xni + ε3i (12b)
where xji denotes a vector of explanatory variables that affect either the optimal tax rate, τo, or
the cost of tax reform, ρ, and εji is the error term. Thus, for the three major taxes: personal
income, corporate income, and sales tax rates, the empirical model can be specified as: 
Y*ijt = xijt′β + εijt     (13)
Under the assumption that the error term, εji, in Eq. (13) follows a logistic distribution, the
multinomial logit model has response probabilities (Pr) for the choice of tax rate cut (j = 1)
and tax rate increase (j = 3) given by
Pr (Yi = j|xi) = j = 1,3  (14)
17 Greene, W. 2008.  Econometric Analysis, 6th edition, Prentice Hall.
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exp (βj′xi) 
1 + ∑jk=1 exp (βk′xi) 
We use the tax reform category of no tax rate change (j = 2) as a reference category. Since
probabilities sum to one, the probability for our reference category j = 2 is given by 
Pr (Yi = 2 |xi) =              (15)
The multinomial logit model provides the log-odds ratio associated with the choices of tax
reform category lower tax rate (j = 1) and raise tax rate (j = 3) as 
ln [ ] = xi ′β1 and ln [ ] = xi ′β3, respectively. 
Thus we have basically two equations: tax rate-cut and tax rate- increase equations.18
In Eq. (13), the effects of the various control variables (xijt) on the tax rate change categories
(Y*ijt) reflect the impacts of various factors on the optimal tax rate. Thus it is directly related to
the simple model we discussed previously. Figure 3 shows the probability distribution
functions for τu and τl for given values of the xijt. Given that the government’s current tax rate
is τ ′, the probability of a tax rate reduction is the shaded area in the left-hand tail of the
distribution for τu in Panel A, and the probability of a tax rate increase is the shaded area in the
right-hand tail of the distribution for τl in Panel B. The model outlined in Section 2 indicates
that changes in the optimal tax rate, τo, or changes in the cost of adjustment, ρ, will affect the
probability of a tax rate reduction or a tax rate increase. Intuitively, those variables that
increase τo will shift the probability density functions (pdfs) for τu and τl to the right, which
will reduce the probability of a tax reduction and increase the probability of a tax rate increase.
Alternatively, any variable that increases ρ will shift the pdf for τu to the right and shift the pdf
for τl to the left, thereby reducing both the probability of a tax rate reduction and a tax rate
increase. The empirical model shown in Eq. (13) should be interpreted in terms of the variables
that affect the optimal tax rate and affect the cost of adjusting the tax rate.
FIGURE 3 
18 See Agresti, Alan. 2007. An introduction to categorical data analysis. John and Wiley and sons. Second Edition.
New Jersey; and Greene 2008. Op. cit.
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In our analysis, we control for various fiscal and political variables that are likely to influence
the province’s optimal tax rate and the cost of adjusting taxes. Table 1 lists the variables that
we have included in the logistic regressions to capture changes in τo, and those that affect ρ as
well as the hypothesized effects of these variables on τo and ρ. The rationale for including each
of these variables is given below.
TABLE 1: THE DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A TAX RATE CHANGE 
Arguably, one of the most important factors that affects a government’s decision to embark on
tax reform is its fiscal position. When governments continuously run budget deficits, they will
be motivated to raise taxes or cut spending or both. Budget surpluses will have the opposite
effects. Thus, as in Hayashi and Boadway,19 we control for these effects by including the
lagged provincial government’s budget deficit-to-GDP ratio (Deficitt-1). A higher budget
deficit-to-GDP ratio is expected to raise the likelihood of tax rate increases and reduce the
likelihood of tax rate cuts. Thus we expect the coefficient of the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio to
be positive in the tax rate increase equation. We also expect the coefficient of this variable to
be negative in the tax rate-cut equation. This is because a higher budget deficit-to-GDP ratio
makes tax rate-cut reforms less likely, due to the implication of tax rate cuts on government tax
revenues, which are needed to finance the various public services. 
The Canadian federal government provides grants to all provinces that allow them to provide
higher levels of public services at lower provincial tax rates. In our analysis, we control for this
effect by including real federal grants per capita (Grant) as an exogenous variable. When
provincial governments receive higher federal grants per capita, they may raise their spending on
public services or lower their tax rates or both. Thus, other things remaining the same, we expect
that higher federal grants per capita to reduce the probability of tax rate increases and raise the
probability of tax rate cuts. That is, we expect the coefficient of federal grants per capita to be
positive and negative in the tax rate-cut and tax rate-increase equations, respectively.
19 Hayashi, M.,and R. Boadway. 2001. “An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business
income taxes in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Economics 34: 481–503. 
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A Province’s Fiscal Variables:
• The provincial government’s deficit (+)
• A simultaneous increase in the province’s other tax rates (?)
• A simultaneous decrease in the province’s other tax rates (?)
Federal Tax Policy:
• A reduction in the federal tax rate (?)
• Per-capita grants from the federal government (-)
Other Provinces’ Tax Policies:
• Other provinces’ tax rates (+)
• A cut in other provinces’ tax rates (-)




• An election in the current year (+)
• An election in the following year (+)
Variables Affecting the Optimal Tax Rate τo Variables Affecting the Cost of Tax Changes ρ
Tax policy choices are likely to be influenced by the ideological orientation of the governing
political party. As discussed widely in the literature, left-leaning governments generally have a
tendency to be pro-tax increase.20 In our analysis, we attempt to capture the political dimension
of tax reform by including a dummy variable for the left-leaning parties. As in Kneebone and
McKenzie,21 we include a dummy variable (Left) that is equal to one if the Premier of the
province belongs to the Liberal Party or the New Democratic Party (NDP) ⎯ the center-left
political parties in Canada. If left-leaning governments tend to be pro-tax increase, we expect
the coefficient of this variable to be negative and positive in the tax rate-cut and tax rate-
increase equations, respectively.
Governments naturally look at their political positions when they contemplate tax reforms.
Consequently, the timing of tax rate changes may well depend on whether the government is
facing an election. Politicians may time the tax reform in order to maximize their chances of
getting re-elected. As Ashworth and Heyndels22 argue, politicians’ opinions about the levels of
tax rates are driven by their belief about the political costs associated with the tax rates. Our
simple theoretical model also suggests that governments compare such costs of a reform with
any benefit of tax rate changes in their decision to change tax rates or not. To control for this
political cycle’s effects on the likelihood of tax reform, we include dummy variables for the
election year and the year after the election. The dummy variables are equal to one if there is
an election in the current year (Electiont) or next year (Electiont+1). We expect that provincial
governments embark on popular tax reforms during election years and postpone unpopular
ones for years after an election. Other things remaining the same, we expect the probability of
tax rate increases to be lower and tax rate cuts to be higher if the provincial government faces
an election in the current or next year. That is, we expect the coefficient of Electiont and
Electiont+1 to be positive and negative in the tax rate-cut and tax rate-increase regressions,
respectively. The reason is that, as noted in the previous section, when the cost of tax reform is
higher, as is the case around election times, the government is less inclined to raise tax rates
and more motivated to cut tax rates.
When governments introduce tax reforms they sometimes change more than one tax rate. Thus
we need to control for the interrelationship between the various major taxes. This is
particularly true for corporate income and personal income tax rates. One basic argument for
the presence of corporate income tax rates is that they can serve as a backstop for personal
income tax rates. When governments change one of the tax rates, they may well also change
the other rate to maintain the integrity of the income tax structure. To account for this, in the
PIT and CIT equations we include two dummy variables that are equal to one if the province
cuts or raises the other tax rate. The variables enter the regression contemporaneously to
account for the possible multiple tax rate changes. 
20 See for example Reed, R. W. 2006. “Democrats, Republicans, and Taxes: Evidence Political Parties Matter,” Journal
of Public Economics 90: 725–50.
21 Kneebone, R. and K. McKenzie. 2001. “Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian
Provinces,” International Tax and Public Finance 8: 753-774.
22 Ashworth, J. and B. Heyndels. 1997. “Politicians’ preferences on local tax rates: An empirical analysis,” European
Journal of Political Economy 13: 479-502.
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The vertical tax externality literature has emphasized the interdependence of provincial and
federal tax bases when both levels of government co-occupy the same tax base.23 Thus the
federal tax rate may influence the likelihood of tax rate changes by the provincial government.
We control for this effect by including the statutory federal corporate income tax rate in the
CIT equations and top personal income tax rates in the PIT equations.24 As the federal goods
and services tax (GST) remained constant for most of the period under consideration, we do
not include the GST in our provincial sales tax equations. 
The literature on horizontal tax competition suggests that, due to the mobile nature of tax
bases, tax rates in other provinces can have a positive effect on a province’s tax base. That is,
when other provinces raise their tax rates, the tax base shifts from the higher-tax jurisdiction to
a lower-tax jurisdiction (see for example Hayashi and Boadway,25 Esteller-Morè and Solè-
Ollè,26 Mintz and Smart,27 Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis,28 Devereux, et al.29 and Dahlby and
Ferede.)30 Thus changes in neighbours’ tax rates can motivate provinces to change their own
tax rates. Arguably personal and corporate income tax bases are more mobile than sales tax
rates. Consequently, we expect that provinces are likely to be influenced not only by the
actions of their immediate geographic neighbours, but also by other provinces in the federation.
Thus, for corporate and personal income tax rates, the “neighbours’ tax rate” is the weighted
average (weighted by the inverse of the distance between major population centres of
provinces) tax rate of all other provinces.31 For sales taxes, on the other hand, we use
immediate geographical proximity to define neighbourliness as commonly used in the
literature. 
Thus, to account for the effects of horizontal tax competition, we include three variables as
control variables. The first one is the weighted average tax rate of other provinces. This
captures the level effects of other provinces’ tax rates. This variable is one period-lagged in
order to avoid the problem of endogeneity. We also account for neighbouring provinces’ tax
rate changes by including two dummy variables: a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
neighbours cut their tax rates and another one if they increase their rates. If the usual horizontal
competition hypothesis holds, we expect the coefficients of lagged tax rates of other provinces
to be negative in the tax rate-cut equation and positive in the tax rate-increase equation,
respectively. This is because when other provinces have a lower tax rate, this would motivate
23 See Dahlby, B. and S. Wilson. 2003. “Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation,” Journal of Public Economics 87:
917-930.
24 The inclusions of federal tax rates of course imply that year-specific effects cannot be included in the model.
25 2001. Op. cit.
26 Esteller-Morè, A., and A. Solè-Ollè. 2002. “Tax setting in a federal system: the case of personal income taxation in
Canada,” International Tax and Public Finance 9: 235–57.
27 Mintz, J., and M. Smart. 2004. “Income shifting, investment and tax competition: theory and evidence from
provincial taxation in Canada,” Journal of Public Economics 88: 1149–1168.
28 Karkalakos S., and C. Kotsogiannis. 2007. “A spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses: evidence
from Canada,” Canadian Journal of Economics 40 (3): 782- 811 24. 
29 2007. Op. cit.
30 Dahlby, B. and E. Ferede. 2012. “The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Tax Bases and the Marginal Cost of Public
Funds for Provincial Governments,” International Tax and Public Finance 19:844-883.
31 See Hayashi and Boadway 2001. Op. cit.
provinces to lower their own rates or discourage them from raising their tax rates. A province is
more likely to cut or raise its tax rates when its neighbours cut or raise their tax rates,
respectively. Thus we expect the coefficient of the dummy variable for a tax rate cut by
neighbours to be positive in the tax rate-cut equation and negative in the tax rate-increase
equations. Similarly, we expect the coefficient of the dummy variable for a tax rate increase by
neighbours to be negative in the tax rate-cut equations and positive in the tax rate-increase
equations. 
In addition to these variables, the province’s own lagged tax rate is likely to have an impact on
the likelihood of a tax rate change. As noted above, a provincial government that inherits a
higher tax rate is more likely to lower its rates and less likely to raise its tax rate. To account
for this, we include the province’s own tax rate in the previous period as an explanatory
variable. We expect the coefficient of this variable to be positive in the tax rate-cut equation
and negative in the tax rate-increase equation. 
While the signs and statistical significance of the multinomial logistic regression coefficient
estimates provide important insights about the impacts of various factors on the likelihood of
tax rate cuts or increases, the numerical magnitudes of the coefficient estimates do not have
straightforward interpretations. Thus, we attempt to explain the importance of the numerical
magnitude for the coefficient estimates by computing the corresponding odds ratios. The odds
ratios are obtained by simply exponentiating the reported multinomial logit estimates. Odds
ratio estimates are non-negative and values greater (less) than one imply that a tax rate change
is more (less) likely to occur relative to the reference category.
3.2. Data
Our empirical specification is estimated using annual aggregate panel data from the 10
Canadian provinces for the period 1973–2010. The data for our empirical analysis come from
various sources. The data on statutory top personal income tax rates (PIT), corporate income
tax rates (CIT), and sales tax rates (PST) were obtained from various issues of Finances of the
Nation (formerly National Finances) published by the Canadian Tax Foundation. Annual
budget balance, population, and federal grants data come from the Statistics Canada database
(CANSIM). The information on governing political parties is from the Canadian Parliamentary
Guide. Appendix 1 provides details on the definitions and sources of data for the various
variables.
As noted before, our analysis focuses on provincial personal income tax, corporate income tax
and sales taxes. Some of the previous studies such as Hayashi and Boadway32 use effective
rather than statutory tax rates in their analysis. However, it is well known that, due to the way
they are often computed, effective tax rates can change even though the government does not
change its tax policies. That is, changes in effective tax rates may be due to changes in
government tax policies or due to changes in other economic variables on which the
computations of the effective rates are based. Thus we believe that statutory tax rates are the
appropriate variable to use in tax policy studies such as ours. 
32 2001. Op. cit.
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The statutory marginal PIT rate generally varies from one income bracket to another. Ideally
we would prefer to construct an average PIT rate using the number of individuals in each
income bracket as a weighting factor. However, such data are unavailable. Consequently, as in
Dahlby and Ferede,33 we use the statutory top PIT rate, including all applicable surtaxes as our
personal income tax rate. We believe that focusing on just the top statutory PIT rate would
capture most of the tax rate changes by provincial governments. The PIT rate also includes all
applicable surtaxes. The CIT rate is also the statutory general corporate income tax rate.
Similarly for the sales tax rate, we use the provincial statutory sales tax rate. For those
provinces which harmonized their sales tax rates with the GST, we consider that there is a sales
tax rate change only when the province adjusts its rate regardless of what happens to the GST. 
TABLE 2: NUMBER OF TIMES THAT GOVERNMENTS CHANGED TAX RATES, 1973-2010 
Table 2 provides some descriptive information on provincial tax rate-change choices for the
three major taxes. During the period under consideration, there were 137 personal income tax
rates changes, 83 corporate income tax rate changes, and only 52 sales tax rate changes by the
provincial governments. Most of the instances of tax rates cuts and increases occur in personal
income taxes. There were 65 PIT rate cuts and 72 PIT rate increases over the period 1973-
2010.34 Note that as the PIT includes applicable surtaxes, PIT rate changes can occur when
there is a change in the statutory PIT rate or when there is a change in a surtax. The number of
PIT rate cuts range from two in Prince Edward Island to 10 in New Brunswick and
Saskatchewan. The number of PIT rate increases varies from two in Quebec to 14 in Ontario.
Corporate income tax rate cuts are also more common in western Canada than Atlantic Canada.
While Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia did not cut the CIT rate during the period, British
Columbia and Manitoba cut their CIT rates six and seven times, respectively. The number of
CIT rate increases also range from two in Prince Edward Island to 10 in Quebec. All Canadian
33 2012. Op. cit.
34 Prior to 2001, provincial personal income tax rates (with the exception of Quebec) were expressed as a percentage of
the federal PIT rate. In such cases, provincial tax rate changes can occur when either the provincial government, or
the federal government or both change their respective PIT rates. As our interest is to analyze the factors that affect
provincial tax rate changes, we only consider a provincial PIT rate change to have occurred if the provincial
government changed its PIT rate, regardless of what happened to the federal PIT rate.
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Newfoundland 2 4 1 5 12 4 31 22 33
PEI 0 2 2 2 9 3 36 27 33
Nova Scotia 0 5 2 4 6 4 34 27 32
New Brunswick 5 10 2 6 8 3 27 20 33
Quebec 3 7 4 10 2 2 25 29 32
Ontario 2 6 1 5 14 3 31 18 34
Manitoba 7 6 1 3 3 3 28 29 34
Saskatchewan 5 10 4 5 4 5 28 24 29
Alberta 5 6 0 3 3 0 30 29 38
British Columbia 6 9 4 5 11 4 27 18 30
All provinces 35 65 21 48 72 31 297 243 328
Tax rate cuts Tax rate increases No tax rate changes
Province CIT PIT PST CIT PIT PST CIT PIT PST 
provinces with the exception of Alberta impose sales taxes. Thus in Table 2, sales tax rate cuts
and increases are zero for Alberta. As Table 2 shows, sales tax rate changes are less common
than CIT and PIT changes. While Newfoundland, Ontario, and Manitoba cut their sales tax
rates only once, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia each cut their sales tax rates four
times. The number of PST increases also ranges from two in Quebec to five in Saskatchewan.
Although the focus of our study is on the direction of tax rate adjustment, the magnitude of tax
rate changes is of interest. Since our PIT rate includes surtaxes, there is a lot of variation in the
magnitude of PIT rate changes. PIT rate cuts range from four-thousandths of a percentage point
(in British Columbia in 1998) to almost seven percentage points (in Saskatchewan in 1977).
PIT rate increases also range between four-thousandths of a percentage point (in British
Columbia in 1997) to about seven percentage points (in Nova Scotia in 1995). The very small
changes in PIT rate observed in British Columbia are due to small changes in the applicable
surtaxes.35 Provincial corporate income tax rate cuts also range from 0.14 of a percentage point
in 2003 to five percentage points in 1982 in Quebec. Similarly corporate income tax rate
increases range from 0.13 of a percentage point (in Quebec in 1987) to five percentage points
(in Prince Edward Island in 1987). Provincial sales tax rate cuts range from 0.07 of a
percentage point (in Quebec in 2006) to four percentage points in Newfoundland in 1998.
Sales tax rate increases also range between 0.3 of a percentage point in New Brunswick to
three percentage points in British Columbia in 1982.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Tables 3-5 present the multinomial logit regression estimates for the probability of tax rate cuts
and increases for the three major provincial taxes: PIT, CIT, and PST. As the state of no tax
rate change is the reference category, the estimated coefficients reflect the effects of the various
covariates on the probability of lowering or raising the tax rate relative to the choice of leaving
the tax rate unchanged. In all cases, columns (1) and (2) show the estimated results for the
probability of lowering and raising the corresponding tax rate, respectively. While we control
for various fiscal and political variables in columns (1) and (2), we include demographic
covariates in columns (3) and (4), but the coefficient estimates of these variables are not
reported for the sake of brevity. We report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity.
In all regressions, we include province-specific fixed effects. Note, however, that due to the
presence of federal fiscal variables and other dummy variables that change only over time, we
do not include year-specific effects in our analysis.
35 Our analysis, however, shows that the results are not sensitive to the exclusion of these very small changes in the PIT
rate.
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We first focus on the discussion of regression results shown in columns (1) and (2) of Tables 3-
5. The estimated regression models generally perform well as measured by the percentage of
correct predictions, the pseudo R-squared, and the log-likelihood ratios. We also present the
average probabilities of tax cuts and tax increases predicted by the model over the period 1973
to 2010 in Table 6. These probabilities are computed based on regression results shown in
columns (1) and (2) of Tables 3-5. Table 6 shows that Quebec has the highest predicted
probability of a CIT rate increase and the lowest predicted probability of a PIT rate increase,
whereas Ontario had the highest predicted probability of a PIT rate increase. Note that because
it does not levy a provincial sales tax, the predicted probabilities of a sales tax rate increase or
decrease for Alberta are zero. 
In order to provide a more intuitive interpretation of the regression results and to assess their
economic as well as statistical significance, we have calculated the changes in the probabilities
of a tax cut or a tax increase from the estimated coefficients in Tables 3-5 when an exogenous
variable changes. We focus our discussion on these changes in probabilities rather than the
reported log-odds ratio estimates as the former are more appealing and intuitive. As shown in
Appendix 4, the changes in probabilities of tax rate changes depend not only on the estimated
coefficients in the tax cut and tax increase equations, but also on the initial or baseline
probabilities. Since these can vary by province, we use the average probabilities of tax cuts and
tax increases predicted by the model over the entire 1973-2010 period for Alberta and Ontario,
to illustrate how the changes in the probabilities vary by province. One can conduct similar
analysis for the other provinces.
4.1. A Province’s Fiscal Variables
In this section we discuss the estimated effects of the fiscal variables identified in Table 1 on
the likelihood of a tax change. As indicated in Figures 2 and 3, the likelihood of a tax change
depends on the tax rates that the government inherits. The coefficients of lagged tax rates
(PITt-1, CITt-1, and PSTt-1) are, as expected, positive in the tax cut equations (column (1)) and
negative in the tax increase equations (column (2)). The results indicate that for the tax rate-cut
equation, the lagged tax rate is statistically significant in the cases of PIT and PST. For the tax
rate-increase equation, it is significant only for CIT and PST. The implication of this is that
while provinces that inherit higher PIT and PST rates are more likely to cut their tax rates,
provinces that inherit higher CIT and PST rates are less likely to raise their tax rates. 
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TABLE 3: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR PIT RATE CHANGES, 1973-2010
Notes: Dependent variable is the probability to lower tax rate (category =1) and raise tax rate (category = 3) relative to the 
probability of holding the tax rate unchanged (in logs). Variables without time subscripts enter the regression 
contemporaneously. Robust asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. In 
columns (3) and (4) we include the unemployment rate, changes in total population, the share of the young 
(population under 10 years of age), the share of the old (population who are 65 and above years of age) as 
additional covariates.
a multiplied by 1000
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PITt-1 0.290*** -0.160 0.303*** -0.230
(0.0849) (0.104) (0.0836) (0.117)
Deficitt-1 -0.115 0.0703 -0.176* 0.0511
(0.0888) (0.0794) (0.0942) (0.0820)
CITcut -0.470 -1.843* -0.373 -2.024**
(0.555) (1.082) (0.552) (1.026)
CITinc -0.119 1.370** -0.0530 1.409**
(0.540) (0.430) (0.577) (0.436)
FedPITcut -1.208 2.298*** -1.056 2.304***
(0.776) (0.472) (0.802) (0.490)
Grant a 0.168 -0.333 -0.00812 -0.698
(0.390) (0.445) (0.437) (0.593)
OtherPITt-1 -0.235** 0.0670 -0.284** 0.125
(0.118) (0.125) (0.119) (0.134)
OtherPITcut 1.432* -0.198 1.423 -0.740
(0.833) (0.729) (0.883) (0.783)
OtherPITinc 0.114 0.533 0.150 -0.0571
(0.909) (0.727) (0.967) (0.763)
Left -0.886** 0.730* -1.044** 0.814**
(0.417) (0.380) (0.452) (0.393)
Election 0.203 0.0222 0.207 0.0564
(0.378) (0.393) (0.388) (0.419)
Electiont+1 0.171 0.0661 0.188 0.137
(0.392) (0.397) (0.396) (0.388)
Constant -2.346 0.503 -0.323 -0.722
(1.903) (2.003) (2.298) (2.273)
Provincial effects Yes Yes
Other covariates No Yes
Number of observations 370 370
Percent correctly predicted 64.6 66.67
Log-likelihood value -265.53 -258.32
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.23
Lower PIT rate Raise PIT rate Lower PIT rate Raise PIT rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TABLE 4: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR CIT RATE CHANGES, 1973-2010
Notes: Dependent variable is the probability to lower tax rate (category =1) and raise tax rate (category = 3) relative to the 
probability of holding the tax rate unchanged (in logs). Variables without time subscripts enter the regression 
contemporaneously. Robust asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. In 
columns (3) and (4) we include the unemployment rate, changes in total population, the share of the young 
(population under 10 years of age), the share of the old (population who are 65 and above years of age) as 
additional covariates.
a multiplied by 1000
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CITt-1 0.202 -0.355** 0.188 -0.348**
(0.152) (0.124) (0.149) (0.122)
Deficitt-1 -0.289** 0.0871 -0.212* 0.0833
(0.107) (0.116) (0.125) (0.133)
PITcut -0.616 -0.339 -0.495 -0.445
(0.719) (0.616) (0.750) (0.628)
PITinc -1.543 1.512*** -1.789* 1.535**
(1.085) (0.459) (1.069) (0.478)
FedCITcut 1.258** 0.229 1.253** 0.223
(0.528) (0.392) (0.549) (0.393)
FedCITinc -0.585 0.817 -0.796 0.809
(1.280) (0.659) (1.381) (0.663)
Grant a 1.14** -0.514 1.33** -0.633
(0.490) (0.548) (0.589) (0.661)
OtherCITt-1 0.208 0.185 0.222 0.202
(0.188) (0.156) (0.179) (0.161)
OtherCITcut 2.321** 3.395** 2.337* 3.312**
(1.139) (1.340) (1.198) (1.339)
OtherCITinc 2.050* 3.315** 2.223* 3.127**
(1.133) (1.303) (1.218) (1.342)
Left 0.725 -0.105 0.752 -0.113
(0.569) (0.415) (0.585) (0.429)
Election 0.379 -0.383 0.472 -0.461
(0.530) (0.443) (0.539) (0.459)
Electiont+1 0.183 -0.685 0.200 -0.793*
(0.534) (0.460) (0.529) (0.469)
Constant -11.26*** -2.069 -11.96*** -3.700
(3.168) (1.937) (3.540) (2.424)
Provincial effects Yes Yes
Other covariates No Yes
Number of observations 370 370
Percent correctly predicted 75.4 76.41
Log-likelihood value -178.55 -176.30
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.29
Lower CIT rate Raise CIT rate Lower CIT rate Raise CIT rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TABLE 5: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR PST RATE CHANGES, 1973-2010
Notes: Dependent variable is the probability to lower tax rate (category =1) and raise tax rate (category = 3) relative to the 
probability of holding the tax rate unchanged (in logs). Variables without time subscripts enter the regression 
contemporaneously. Robust asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. In 
columns (3) and (4) we include the unemployment rate, changes in total population, the share of the young 
(population under 10 years of age), the share of the old (population who are 65 and above years of age) as 
additional covariates.
a multiplied by 1000
TABLE 6: AVERAGE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF TAX RATE CUTS AND INCREASES, 1973-2010
Note: The probabilities are the average values for the period 1973-2010 and computed based on log-odds ratio estimates 
of Tables 3-5.
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PSTt-1 1.852** -0.736** 2.253** -0.952***
(0.663) (0.253) (0.785) (0.250)
Deficitt-1 -0.628** 0.352** -0.655** 0.335**
(0.200) (0.130) (0.207) (0.114)
Grant a 1.580** -0.0919 0.881 0.424
(0.687) (0.367) (0.971) (0.422)
OtherPSTt-1 0.002 0.677* 0.446 0.643
(0.409) (0.354) (0.463) (0.446)
OtherPSTcut 1.265** 0.273 1.250 0.507
(0.634) (0.890) (0.813) (0.972)
OtherPSTinc -0.0155 1.105** 0.105 1.050*
(0.771) (0.542) (0.847) (0.574)
Left -1.640** 0.517 -2.255** 0.526
(0.659) (0.472) (0.796) (0.595)
Election 0.776 -1.829** 0.767 -1.983**
(0.621) (0.771) (0.610) (0.769)
Electiont+1 0.486 -0.621 0.332 -0.639
(0.587) (0.469) (0.595) (0.489)
Constant -15.44** 2.512 -12.16** -2.038
(4.973) (1.621) (5.477) (2.187)
Provincial effects Yes Yes
Other covariates No Yes
Number of observations 370 370
Percent correctly predicted 81.8 85.13
Log-likelihood value -137.64 -128.16
Pseudo R-squared 0.26 0.31
Lower PST rate Raise PST rate Lower PST rate Raise PST rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NFL 0.0541 0.1351 0.1081 0.3243 0.0270 0.1081
PEI 0.0000 0.0541 0.0541 0.2432 0.0541 0.0811
NS 0.0000 0.1081 0.1351 0.1622 0.0541 0.0811
NB 0.1081 0.1622 0.2432 0.2162 0.0541 0.0811
QB 0.0811 0.2703 0.1892 0.0541 0.1081 0.0540
ON 0.0541 0.1351 0.1622 0.3784 0.0270 0.0811
MB 0.1892 0.0811 0.1622 0.0811 0.0270 0.0811
SK 0.1351 0.1351 0.2703 0.1081 0.1081 0.1351
AB 0.1351 0.0811 0.1622 0.0811 0.0000 0.0000
BC 0.1351 0.1351 0.2432 0.2973 0.1081 0.1081
All provinces 0.0892 0.1297 0.1730 0.1946 0.0568 0.0838
Province CIT cut CIT increase PIT cut PIT increase PST cut PST increase
Our empirical results show that a provincial government’s lagged deficit-to-GDP ratio
(Deficitt-1) has no statistically significant effect on PIT rate cuts and increases. However, as
expected, the variable is negative and statistically significant in the CIT rate-cut equation but it
is not significant in the CIT rate-increase equation. This result reflects a feature of the simple
model of the previous section, which predicted that a provincial government may have
asymmetric responses to changes in its fiscal environment. The results indicate that provincial
governments with a higher deficit-to-GDP ratio are less likely to cut the CIT rate rather than
leave it unchanged. Our model indicates that a one percentage point increase in the deficit ratio
would reduce the probability of a CIT rate cut by 3.4 percentage points in Alberta and 1.5
percentage points in Ontario. It would raise the probability of a CIT rate increase by less than
one percentage point in both provinces. Table 5 also shows that a provincial government’s
lagged deficit-to-GDP ratio has statistically significant effects on the likelihood of sales tax rate
cuts and increases. Our model indicates that in Ontario a one percentage point increase in the
deficit ratio would reduce the probability of a PST rate cut by 1.7 percentage points, and raise
the probability of a PST rate increase by 2.8 percentage points.  
While federal grants per capita (Grant) seem to have no statistically significant effects on PIT
rate changes, they have significant effects in the CIT and PST rate-cut equations. The results in
column (1) of Table 4 show that higher real federal grants per capita increase the probability of
a CIT rate cut rather than leave it unchanged. The model implies that if the annual real federal
grant per capita increases by $100, the probability of a CIT rate cut would increase by 1.3
percentage points in Alberta and by 0.5 percentage points in Ontario. Similarly, Table 5 shows
that the federal grants per capita variable has a statistically significant effect only in the PST
rate- cut equation in column (1). However, the estimated increase in the probability of a PST
rate cut would be less than one percentage point for a $100 per-capita grant increase. 
A provincial government’s likelihood of changing the PIT rate may well depend on what
happens to the CIT rate and vice versa, as the link between the two taxes is often viewed as
important for maintaining the integrity of the income tax system. In order to check the effects
of corporate income tax rate changes on the likelihood of PIT rate changes, in Table 3 we
include two dummy variables. The first one is a dummy variable (CITcut) that is equal to one
if the province cuts the CIT rate and zero otherwise. The second variable (CITinc) is also a
dummy variable that is equal to one if the province raises the CIT rate and zero otherwise.
Similarly, to check the influence of PIT rate changes on the likelihood of CIT changes, in Table
4 we include two dummy variables: one for a PIT cut and another for a PIT increase.  
Regression results in Table 3 shows that the coefficient estimates for both CITcut and CITinc
variables are not statistically significant in the PIT rate-cut equation, suggesting that
contemporaneous changes in the CIT rate do not affect the likelihood of PIT rate cut. However,
the coefficient estimates of CITcut and CITinc are statistically significant at the 10 and five per
cent levels in column (2) of Table 3. These results suggest that while a cut in the CIT rate
reduces the likelihood of PIT rate increase, an increase in the CIT rate raises the likelihood of a
PIT rate increase. The implication is that provinces tend to increase PIT and CIT rates together
to maintain the integrity of the income tax system while raising additional tax revenues,
whereas a CIT rate cut (weakly) reduces the likelihood of a PIT rate increase. 
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In Table 4, on the other hand, the coefficient of PITinc is positive and statistically significant at
the one per cent level in the CIT rate-increase equation. For Alberta, our model indicates that a
PIT rate increase reduces the probability of a CIT rate cut by 1.7 percentage points and raises
the probability of a CIT rate increase by 11.3 percentage points. For Ontario, it would reduce
the probability of a CIT rate cut by 11 percentage points and increase the probability of a CIT
rate increase by 17.7 percentage points. The coefficient estimates of PITcut are not statistically
significant in either equation. This seems to indicate that provincial governments tend to raise
PIT and CIT rates at the same time, while PIT rate reductions are not coordinated with CIT rate
cuts.
4.2. Federal Tax Policy
For the PIT, we include a dummy variable (FedPITcut) that is equal to one if the federal
government cuts its PIT rate in the current period and zero otherwise as an explanatory
variable. During the period under consideration, the federal government cut its PIT rate only
three times (in 1977, 1982, and 1988) and it did not raise its PIT rate. Thus we only include a
dummy variable when there is a federal PIT cut. In 1977, as part of the introduction of the
Established Program Financing (EPF) grants, the federal government cut its PIT and CIT rates,
which enabled the provinces to take up the vacated federal tax room.36 Unlike the federal PIT
reform of 1977, the 1982 and 1987 federal PIT cuts were not coordinated with tax changes
with the provincial governments or changes to the grant system.
The regression results of Table 3 suggest that FedPITcut is positive and statistically significant
in the PIT rate-increase equation. This indicates that a provincial government is more likely to
raise its PIT rate when the federal government lowers its PIT rate. For Alberta, a cut in the
federal PIT rate reduces the probability of a provincial PIT rate cut by three percentage points
and increases the probability of a PIT rate increase by 17.1 percentage points. For Ontario, a
federal PIT rate cut reduces the probability of a provincial PIT rate cut by 14.1 per cent and
increases the probability of a provincial PIT rate increase by 54.1 percentage points. This is
consistent with the view that provinces move in to fill the room created by federal PIT cuts.
One may wonder if the response of the provincial governments to the 1977 federal tax reform
was the sole reason for the observed positive coefficient of the FedPITcut variable. However,
in a separate regression not reported in Table 3, we find that even after controlling for the
effect of the 1977 reform using a dummy variable, the coefficient of FedPITcut is still positive
and statistically significant.
With respect to CIT, the federal government has both reduced and increased its rate during the
period under study. Thus we include two control variables. The first one is, FedCITcut, a
dummy variable that is equal to one if there is a federal CIT cut or zero otherwise. Similarly,
the second variable (FedCITinc) is equal to one if there is a federal CIT rate increase or zero
otherwise. Thus the omitted reference point is the category of no federal CIT rate change.
36 See http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/his-eng.asp on the history of the 1977 EPF reforms.
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The regression results in Table 4 indicate that there are different responses to federal PIT and
CIT rate cuts. The coefficient estimate of FedCITcut is positive and statistically significant in
the CIT rate-cut equation, indicating that provincial governments are more likely to cut their
CIT rates when the federal government cuts its CIT rate. The dummy variable for a federal CIT
increase has the expected signs in both equations. However, it is not statistically significant in
either equation. Our model indicates that in response to a cut in the federal CIT rate, the
probability of Alberta cutting its CIT rate increases by 14.7 percentage points and the
probability of a provincial CIT rate increase falls by 1.4 percentage points. For Ontario, a
federal CIT rate cut increases the probability of a provincial CIT rate cut by 6.4 percentage
points and lowers the probability of a provincial CIT rate increase by about one percentage
point.
4.3. Other Provinces’ Tax Policies
How responsive are provincial governments to tax rate changes by other provinces? Table 4
shows that the coefficient estimates of lagged tax CIT rates of other provinces (OtherCITt-1)
are not statistically significant in either CIT rate-cut or increase equations. On the other hand,
Tables 3 and 5 respectively show that lagged PIT (OtherPITt-1) and lagged PST (OtherPITt-1)
of other provinces are statistically significant in their respective tax rate-cut and tax rate-
increase equations. These results suggest that a province is less likely to cut its PIT rate when
the average PIT rate of other provinces is high. For Alberta and Ontario, a one percentage point
increase in other provinces’ PIT rates lowers the probability of a provincial PIT rate cut by 3.2
percentage points and has a negligible effect on the probability of a PIT rate increase.
Similarly, Table 5 shows that the coefficient of neighbouring provinces’ sales tax rates,
OtherPSTt-1, is positive and statistically significant in the tax rate-increase equation, indicating
that a provincial government is more likely to raise its sales tax rate, rather than leave it
unchanged, when its neighbouring provinces’ sales tax rates increase. For Ontario, an increase
in other provinces’ PST rates increases the probability of a provincial PST rate increase by
8.2 per cent and has a negligible effect on the probability of a PST rate cut.
As an alternative way of assessing the importance of horizontal tax competition, we included
dummy variables that capture tax rate cuts and increases by other provinces as covariates. In
Tables 3-5, these dummy variables for tax rate cuts by other provinces are OtherPITcut,
OtherCITcut and OtherPSTcut. Similarly we include dummy variables OtherPITinc,
OtherCITinc and OtherPSTinc to capture tax rate increases by other provinces. In all cases the
omitted reference point is the category of no tax rate changes by other provinces. The
regression results indicate that the coefficient of the dummy variable for a PIT rate cut by other
provinces (OtherPITcut) is positive and statistically significant in the tax rate-cut equation at
the 10 per cent level, but insignificant in the PIT rate increase equation. This suggests that a
province is more likely to cut its PIT rate when other provinces cut their PIT rates. These
horizontal competition variables are, however, not statistically significant in the tax rate-
increase equation. In other words, our results provide weak empirical support for the
proposition that provinces tend to match PIT tax rate cuts, rather than increases made by other
provinces.
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Table 4 indicates that, consistent with the corporate tax rate competition literature, a cut in the
CIT rate by other provinces makes a province more likely to cut its CIT rate. Similarly,
provincial governments are more likely to raise their CIT rates, rather than leave them
unchanged, when other provinces raise their CIT rates. However, the coefficient estimate for
OtherCITcut is positive and significant in the tax rate-increase equation, which is inconsistent
with our prior expectations, while the coefficient estimate of OtherCITinc is positive in the tax
rate-cut equations, although it is significant only at the 10 per cent level.
4.4. The Political Environment
In this section, we describe our findings concerning the effects of political variables on the
timing of tax rate changes. Recall that we have defined a dummy variable (Left) that is equal to
one if the Premier of the province belongs to the Liberal Party or the New Democratic Party
(NDP). Our results indicate that while the ideology of the governing party does not seem to
have a statistically significant effect for CIT rate changes, it is important in explaining the
probability of raising or lowering the PIT rate and lowering the PST rate. The coefficient
estimate on Left for the PIT is negative in the tax rate-cut equation but positive in the tax rate-
increase equation. In both cases the coefficient estimates are also statistically significant. The
results suggest that provinces with left-leaning governing parties are less likely to cut the PIT
rate and more likely to raise the PIT rate. Our model indicates that a Left government in
Alberta would reduce the probability of a PIT rate cut by 12 percentage points and increase the
probability of a PIT rate increase by 1.2 percentage points. For Ontario, a Left government also
reduces the probability of a PIT rate cut by 12 percentage points and increases the probability
of a PIT increase by 5.4 percentage points. The implication of our result is that ideology seems
to matter — provinces with left-leaning governments are generally less likely to cut and more
likely to raise the PIT rate.
The ideological dummy variable has the expected signs in both equations for PST, but it is
statistically significant only in the tax rate-cut equation. Thus there is an asymmetrical response
by provincial governments to the ideological variable. The result suggests that left-leaning
provincial governments are less likely to cut the sales tax rate. Our model indicates that a Left
government in Ontario raises the probability of a PST increase by 8.2 percentage points and
would have a negligible effect on the probability of a PST cut. 
In our analysis, we also include the timing of elections as additional political control variables.
The results in Tables 3-5 show that the two election dummy variables do not seem to have
statistically significant effects on the likelihood of PIT and CIT rate changes. However, the
coefficient estimate of election dummy for the current year is negative and statistically
significant in the PST rate-increase equation. This suggests that provincial governments are
less likely to raise the sales tax rate, rather than leave it unchanged when there is an election in
the current year. The reason may be partly due to the widely held perception that these taxes
are unfair to low-income people. This makes them a less popular choice during election years.
For Ontario, a PST rate increase is 13.6 percentage points lower in an election year.
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So far, our set of control variables includes those variables that account for the province’s
fiscal position, political environment, and vertical and horizontal tax competition. However,
one may argue that it is important to control for demographic variables to capture the fiscal
needs of provincial governments. To address this concern, in columns (3) and (4) of Tables 3-5
we include the unemployment rate, changes in total population, the share of the young
(population under 10 years of age), and the share of the old (population who are 65 and above
years of age) as additional covariates. 
The regression results of columns (3) and (4) are qualitatively similar to those of columns (1)
and (2), respectively. There are, however, some minor changes that occur as a result of
including additional covariates. For PIT regression, the coefficient of the lagged deficit-to-GDP
ratio is now, as expected, negative and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level in the
PIT rate-cut equation. In the CIT regression, on the other hand, comparison of columns (3) and
(4) with the corresponding results of columns (1) and (2) reveal that now the variable PITcut is
negative and significant at the 10 per cent level. Finally, for the PST regression, the only
change is that the coefficient of federal grants per capita becomes statistically insignificant in
the PST cut equation once we control for the demographic covariates. Thus, our results seem to
be generally robust to the inclusion of additional covariates.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The literature on optimal taxation suggests that tax rates should be continuously adjusted by
governments so that the marginal cost of public funds is equalized across tax bases and is equal
to the marginal benefit of government spending financed by the tax revenue. In practice,
statutory tax rate changes are not that common. In fact, tax rates tend to be “sticky,” a
characteristic that is not consistent with the normative theory of optimal taxation or with
conventional models of tax competition by subnational governments. Why are tax rates so
“sticky?” What factors induce government to change their tax rates?
In this this paper we examine the factors that influence governments’ decision to lower or raise
statutory tax rates. Our paper makes two important contributions to the literature. First, we
develop a simple theoretical model that explains why statutory tax rates tend to be “sticky.” We
assume that governments embark on a tax reform by comparing the gains from adjusting tax
rates with the associated fixed costs of the reform. Tax rates tend to be “sticky” if the cost of
the tax reform outweighs the potential benefit from the reform. The likelihood of a tax rate
change is affected by variables which determine the optimal tax rate and by variables that
affect the cost of introducing a tax rate change.
Second, we empirically investigate the likelihood of tax rate changes using multinomial logit
regression model for Canadian provincial governments over the period 1973-2010. The choice
of this empirical approach is justified on the grounds that governments face three distinctive
choices about tax rate changes: to lower the tax rate, to raise the tax rate, or to keep the tax rate
unchanged. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate the likelihood of
tax rate changes in a multi-category discrete tax rate setting. We focus on the three major taxes
used by Canadian provincial governments: personal income tax rates, corporate income tax
rates, and general sales tax rates. 
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Our empirical analysis shows that the fiscal position of the provinces, political variables, and
the tax policies of the federal government and other provincial governments in the federation
influence the likelihood of tax rate changes. We argue that for these reasons, variables affect
the costs and benefits associated with tax reform, and the empirical results are broadly
consistent with the simple model outlined in Section 2. Regarding the impact of the fiscal
position of the province on the likelihood of a tax reform, we find that a weaker fiscal position,
as manifested by a higher provincial budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, reduces the probability of a
CIT rate cut and raises the probability of a PST rate increase. This may be driven by the need
to raise more tax revenues in the face of higher budget deficits. Surprisingly, we do not find a
similar effect of deficits on the PIT. 
For politicians, the cost of a tax reform is its effect on the probability of winning an election.
Surprisingly, however, our results show that whether provincial governments face elections in
the current or following year does not matter for the likelihood of PIT and CIT changes. But,
consistent with the general perception that sales taxes are unpopular, our results indicate that
provincial governments are less likely to raise sales taxes during an election year. The ideology
of the provincial government also seems to matter in the likelihood of embarking on tax
reforms. We find that provinces with left-leaning governments are less likely to cut PIT and
PST rates, and more likely to raise PIT rates compared to non-left-leaning governments.  
Another important finding of our paper is the response of provincial governments to tax rate
changes by the federal government. Our results suggest that provincial governments have
different responses to federal PIT and CIT cuts. While federal CIT cuts raise the likelihood of
provincial CIT cuts, federal PIT cuts raise the likelihood of provincial PIT increases. The latter
is consistent with the view that provinces move in to fill the room created by federal PIT cuts.
Furthermore, consistent with the horizontal competition literature, we find that provincial
governments are more likely to cut their PIT and CIT rates when their neighbours lower their
rates. Provinces are also more likely to increase their PST rates when their neighbours raise
their rates. 
In sum, the empirical results for the three major taxes used by Canadian provincial
governments are broadly consistent with our simple model, and highlight the factors that are
likely to influence provincial governments’ decisions to embark on tax rate reforms. In general,
the fiscal position of the government, its political orientation and tax rate changes by the
federal government and other provincial governments affect the likelihood of tax rate changes
by a provincial government. While our model is the first to look at governments’ tax rate
decisions in a multi-choice setting, there are some shortcomings to be addressed in the future.
First, our theoretical model deals specifically with commodity taxation. It also assumes that the
adjustment costs are fixed. Although relaxing these assumptions is unlikely to change the
empirical results, it may be important to relax this assumption and apply the model to income
tax changes. Second, our empirical model does not explicitly model the political costs of a tax
rate change or deal with the dynamics of tax reform. Third, tax rate changes by provincial
governments and the federal government may occur simultaneously, and this may create the
usual endogeneity problems. Some of these limitations can be good avenues for future
researches exploring tax adjustments and the various associated costs and benefits of tax
reforms.
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APPENDIX 1:  DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
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Population 
Corporate income tax rate
(CIT)
Top personal income
marginal tax rate (PIT)
Sales tax rate











Provincial statutory top marginal corporate income
tax rate (General rate)
Provincial income tax rate of the top income bracket
including applicable surtaxes
Provincial sales tax rate (PST)
Statutory top marginal corporate income tax rate
(General rate) levied by the federal government
Federal income tax rate of the top income bracket
The weighted average (weighed by the inverse of the
distance between major population centres) CIT of
other provinces in the federation
The weighted average (weighed by the inverse of the
distance between major population centers) PIT of
other provinces in the federation
The weighted average (weighed by the inverse of the
distance between major population centers) PST of
contiguous provinces 
Provincial government budget deficit
Federal grants to the provinces
Dummy variable for election years
A dummy variable that is equal to one if the Premier
of the province belongs to the NDP or the Liberal
Parties
CANSIM Table 051-0001.
Finances of the Nation
(formerly National Finances)
Finances of the Nation
(formerly National Finances)
Finances of the Nation
(formerly National Finances)
Finances of the Nation
(formerly National Finances)
Finances of the Nation
(formerly National Finances)
Computed from provincial CIT
data












Variable                               Description Source


















income tax and social
security tax systems for
27 EU countries between
2000 and 2007.
Changes to the statutory
corporate income tax rate
for up to 32 European
countries, 1980 to 2007. 
Increases in the nominal
tobacco and gasoline tax
rates by 48 US states,
1977 to 1997. 
Personal income tax rate
changes by Canadian
provinces over the period
1976-2006.
Corporate income tax rate
cuts using a sample of 68
countries over the period
1981-2005.
Business tax rate changes
for German municipalities














The likelihood of a tax change is lower when
governments are in power for longer times
between elections, and when either a left-
wing or a right-wing government is in power;
the occurrence of tax changes was not linked
to the timing of elections; the number of
political parties in a coalition government
was a better predictor of reforms than either
the measures of the business cycle, labour
market pressures or other socioeconomic
variables.  
Countries with high CIT rates are more likely
to reduce their rates; higher neighboring
countries’ tax rates reduce the probability of
tax rate reductions; the probability for a cut
in the CIT rate is 10 to 13 percentage points
higher during an election period.
A higher state tax rate lowers the probability
of a cigarette and gasoline tax rate increase;
a higher average state rate raise the
probability of a cigarette tax rate increase,
but does not have a significant effect on the
probability of a gasoline tax rate increase. A
higher per-capita grant lowers the probability
of a cigarette tax increase; Democrat control
of a state legislature raises the probability of
a cigarette tax rate increase. The probability
of a gasoline tax rate increase is lower when
the state income tax rate is higher.
The occurrence of personal income tax rate
(PIT) changes is affected by the federal PIT
rate; the magnitude of the tax rate changes
is mainly driven by the PIT rates of other
provinces.
Countries that reduced their corporate
income tax rate in the past are more likely to
cut it again in the future; countries lower their
corporate income tax rate when their rates
deviate significantly from those of their
competitors. 
Tax rate growth falls during election years, but
increases after election years.
Study                    Data Statistical Technique   Key Results
APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS, 1972-2010
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RefPIT Dependent variable: “1” = PIT rate cut; 
“2”= no PIT rate change; “3”= PIT rate increase 380 2.0184 0.6009 1 3
RefCIT Dependent variable: “1” = CIT rate cut; 
“2”= no CIT rate change; “3”= CIT rate increase 380 2.0342 0.4667 1 3
RefPST Dependent variable: “1” = PST rate cut; 
“2”= no PST rate change; “3”= PST rate increase 380 2.0263 0.3695 1 3
PITt-1 Lagged provincial statutory top PIT rate (%) 380 19.0788 4.1247 10.00 33.00
CITt-1 Lagged provincial statutory CIT rate (%) 380 13.8352 2.6397 5.50 17.00
PST-1 Lagged provincial statutory PST rate (%) 380 7.2365 3.0013 0.00 12.00
Deficitt-1 Lagged deficit to GDP ratio (%) 380 0.9797 2.1109 -6.5934 9.3253
Grant Federal Grant per capita (2002 dollars) 390 1816 969 466 6314
Left Dummy=1 if the premier belongs to a left-leaning 
party 390 0.4923 0.5006 0 1
Election Dummy=1 if there is an election in the current 
year 390 0.2615 0.4400 0 1
Electiont+1 Dummy=1 if there is an election next year 380 0.2632 0.4409 0 1
FedPITcut Dummy=1 if the federal government cuts its PIT 
rate 380 0.0789 0.2700 0 1
FedCITcut Dummy=1 if the federal government cuts its CIT 
rate 380 0.3684 0.4830 0 1
FedCITinc Dummy=1 if the federal government raises its 
CIT rate 380 0.1579 0.3651 0 1
OtherPITt-1 Lagged weighted average PIT rate of other
provinces (%) 380 19.1386 2.2081 14.92 26.47
OtherCITt-1 Lagged weighted average CIT rate of other 
provinces (%) 380 13.7222 1.4970 10.78 16.20
OtherPSTt-1 Lagged weighted average PST rate of neighbouring 
provinces (%) 380 6.6804 3.0531 0.00 11.00
Variable      Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
APPENDIX 4: PREDICTIONS OF CHANGES IN PROBABILITIES OF TAX CUTS AND 
TAX INCREASES FROM THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES 
Consider the following simplified version of the multinomial logit model:
Suppose p1, p2, and p3 denote the probabilities of tax rate cuts, no tax rate change, and tax rate
increases, respectively. Our multinomial logit model that takes the state of no tax rate change
as a reference category is simply specified as: 
ln ( ) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … +e1
ln ( ) = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + … +e3
The coefficients from the above equations, β’s and b’s, are respectively the log-odds ratio
estimates of tax rate cuts and increases. We report such results in Tables 3-5.
A change in an exogenous variable, x1, has the following effect on the p1/p2 and p3/p2 ratios:
Δln ( ) = β1 Δx1 
Δln ( ) = b1 Δx1 ; or
Δ ( )
Δ ( )
Therefore we can solve for the Δps from the following three equations, given p1, p2, p3, b1,
and β1:
– Δp2 =      β1 Δx1
– Δp2 =      b1 Δx1
Δp1 + Δp2 + Δp3 = 0
This system yields the following equations:
Δp1 = p1 [ β1 (1 – p1) – p3b1] Δx1
Δp3 = p3 [ b1 (1 – p3) – p1β1] Δx1
In computing the changes in the probabilities we have only used the coefficient estimates that
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